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THE PROTECTION OF DEPOSITS AND DEPOSITORS:
A LIMITED INTERPRETATION OF 12 U.S.C. § 1833A
Alyssa King+
The Financial Crisis of 2008, and resulting economic recession, imposed
enormous costs on the American people—tens of millions of Americans lost
their jobs; trillions of dollars in household wealth disappeared; retirement
accounts and life savings vanished; and millions of families faced foreclosure.1
As a result, the United States government promptly implemented a
comprehensive response to the crisis utilizing drastic fiscal and monetary tools.2

+
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2011, University of Virginia. The author would like to thank Professor Heidi Mandanis Schooner
for her guidance, support, and invaluable insight. The author also wishes to thank her colleagues
on the Catholic University Law Review for their exceptional work on this Comment. Finally, she
thanks her family for their love and support throughout law school.
1. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES
xv, available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf [hereinafter THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT]; see also Bill Thomas, Keith Hennessey, & Douglas
Holtz-Eakin, What Caused the Financial Crisis, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2011, at A21 (summarizing
the findings of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission and criticizing the potentially
oversimplified explanation of the origins of the crisis).
2. See The Recovery Act, THE AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT,
http://www.recovery.gov/arra/About/Pages/The_Act.aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 2014) (outlining the
government’s response to the Financial Crisis); see also The Federal Reserve’s Response to the
Financial Crisis and Actions to Foster Maximum Employment and Price Stability, FED. RES. (last
updated Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_crisisresponse.htm
(detailing the monetary tools that the Federal Reserve utilized); Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed.
Reserve Bd. of Governors, The Crisis and the Policy Response (Jan. 13, 2009),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090113a.htm [hereinafter Chairman
Bernanke Speech] (discussing the crisis and the Federal Reserve’s response).
In response to the financial crisis, Congress passed the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009, often referred to as the “stimulus package,” to encourage job creation
and economic growth. See The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.
111-5, 123 Stat. 115; The Recovery Act, supra. The Treasury Department, through the Troubled
Asset Relief Program (TARP) that was “authorized by Congress through the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008,” purchased upwards of $700 billion worth of distressed mortgage-backed
securities to help stabilize the U.S. financial markets. What Is TARP?, U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/about-tarp/Pages/what-istarp.aspx; Treasury Announces $700 Billion Bailout Plan for Mortgage Debt, ANDREWS FIN.
CRISIS LITIG. REP., 2008 WL 4601773 (Sept. 25, 2008) (explaining that the bailout plan would help
the economy recover “by removing distressed assets from the financial system” as a means to
alleviate the credit shortage). See generally Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub.
L. No. 110–343, 122 Stat. 3765.
The Federal Reserve undertook measures to stabilize the economy, mend the credit
market, and avert a panic by instituting a series of emergency lending programs and by purchasing
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The response was an effort to “prevent[] the collapse of the financial system, []
restart[] economic growth, and [] restor[e] access to credit and capital.”3 The
financial crisis not only affected the United States, but also created a world-wide
recession.4 Governments across the world took drastic measures to stabilize the
financial markets.5
In addition, the U.S. government turned to the justice system to hold those
who were involved in fraudulent conduct associated with the crisis accountable
for their actions. 6 A recent example of such action is a lawsuit that the
Department of Justice (DOJ) filed against Bank of America and several of its
affiliates for their role in residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) fraud.7
In addition to alleging investor fraud, the complaint seeks civil penalties under
the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989
(FIRREA), 8 which is codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1833a. 9 This action is
representative of the government’s newest approach to combatting financial

mortgage-backed securities and government debt. Sewell Chan, Bernanke, Pointing to 1930s,
Credits Fed’s Actions for Avoiding a Worse Downturn, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2010, at B4.
Additionally, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act to reform the financial industry in hopes of avoiding future crises. Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). This act
significantly changed the regulation of financial institutions. Wall Street Reform: The Dodd-Frank
Act, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/economy/middle-class/dodd-frank-wall-streetreform (last visited Jan. 28, 2014). The government placed the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation (Freddie Mac) and the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), the
Nation’s largest housing finance institutions, under conservatorship in order to stabilize the housing
market and strengthen their weakened financial conditions. Treasury Announces $700 Billion
Bailout Plan For Mortgage Debt, supra; Mark Jickling, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in
Conservatorship, CONG. RES. SERV. 2 (Sept. 15, 2008), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/
organization/110097.pdf.
3. Financial Crisis Response in Charts, Introduction, U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY 2 (April
13, 2012), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/Documents/20120413_
FinancialCrisisResponse.pdf.
4. Chairman Bernanke Speech, supra note 2.
5. See EU Austerity Drive Country by Country, BBC NEWS EUROPE (May 21, 2012),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10162176; see also Financial Turmoil Timeline, FED. RES. BANK OF
N.Y., http://newyorkfed.org/research/global_economy/Crisis_Timeline.pdf (last visited Apr. 13,
2014) (showing the actions taken by the Federal Reserve system and other central banks).
6. See Exec. Order No. 13,519, 3 C.F.R. 271 (2009) (establishing the Financial Fraud
Enforcement Task Force to deal with financial crimes that specifically relate to the financial crisis
and recovery).
7. Complaint, United States v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 13–CV–446 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 6,
2013), 2013 WL 4007594. The complaint alleges that Bank of America committed various acts of
financial and investment fraud. Id.; see also Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Dep’t of Justice Sues
Bank of America for Defrauding Investors in Connection with Sale of Over $850 Million of
Residential Mortgage Backed Securities (Aug. 6, 2013), http://www.stopfraud
.gov/iso/opa/stopfraud/2013/13-ag-886.html [hereinafter DOJ Press Release].
8. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183.
9. Id.
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fraud.10 In other financial fraud cases, the government has sought civil penalties
under FIRREA,11 but now, the government intends to apply this provision to
allegations of fraud associated with the creation, issuance, and sale of RMBSs.12
The FIRREA civil penalties provision is a tool that the government uses to
exact civil monetary penalties from persons who allegedly commit certain
enumerated crimes, including banking-related criminal offenses and frauds.13
Until recently, courts had yet to interpret the language of the civil penalties
provision.14 In light of the government’s recent reliance on this provision, it is
important to understand FIRREA’s scope and possible limitations through a
proper interpretation of the statute.
This Comment will argue that while the courts have broadly interpreted
FIRREA’s civil penalties provision, there are numerous limiting considerations
within the provision’s text, structure, and legislative history that require a
narrower interpretation focused on the effects of fraudulent conduct on federally
insured deposits or depositors. In Part I, this Comment discusses the interplay
between the origins and effects of the financial crisis, the structure and practices
of the financial industry, particularly the use of RMBSs, and the effects of the
crisis on the banking system. Part II traces the origins and development of
FIRREA as an anti-fraud enforcement tool. Part III analyzes recent, postfinancial crisis cases interpreting the FIRREA civil penalties provision. Part IV
examines the text, structure, and legislative intent of the civil penalties provision
to illustrate its necessary limitations. Part V suggests that the proper application
of the statute to RMBS fraud cases is limited and must center on the effects of
fraud on federally insured deposits and depositors. This Comment concludes
that while the use of the FIRREA civil penalties provision may be an effective
tool in combatting financial fraud, the government must be aware of the inherent
limitations of the statute when utilizing the provision as part of its enforcement
scheme. This Comment also serves as a guidepost for both the government and
the banking industry regarding the proper scope and application of FIRREA’s
civil penalties provision.

10. See DOJ Press Release, supra note 7 (asserting that the Bank of America Complaint
“marks the latest step forward in the Justice Department’s ongoing efforts to hold accountable those
who engage in fraudulent or irresponsible conduct”).
11. See United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 12 Civ. 7527(JMF), 2013 WL 5312564,
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2013) (alleging misconduct in the origination and underwriting of
government-insured home mortgage loans); United States v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 12 Civ.
1422(JSR), 2013 WL 4437232, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2013) (alleged fraud in connection with
the sale of mortgage loans to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac); United States v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon,
941 F. Supp. 2d 438, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (alleging fraud associated with foreign exchange trade).
12. Complaint, supra note 7, at 1; DOJ Press Release, supra note 7.
13. 12 U.S.C. § 1833a (2012).
14. See Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 443 (presenting an issue of first impression
for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York).
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I. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2008
A. Origins of the Crisis
In 2008, the financial markets suffered the largest losses since the Great
Depression.15 The collapse of the housing bubble16 sent a shock through the
financial system, which had relied heavily on the issuance of residential
mortgages to fuel the growth of asset-backed securities.17 Falling housing prices
caused the seizure of credit, which in turn caused the assets, held by the large
investment banks and backed by the failing mortgages, to disintegrate.18 The
utilization of derivatives magnified the losses.19 The origins, scope, and effects
of the financial crisis can be understood best by examining the financial
industry’s regulatory environment and structure.
1. “The Sentries Were Not at Their Posts”20
Many associate the financial crisis with the greed and corruption of the
financial industry, 21 but the failures of financial regulatory agencies and
15. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates
and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 966 (2009). Wilmarth
outlined the effects of the financial crisis and noted that the financial crisis triggered a world-wide
recession. Id. at 967. He explained that:
Global stock market values declined by $35 trillion during 2008 and early 2009, and
global economic output [fell] in 2009 for the first time since World War II. In the United
States . . . markets for stocks and homes [] suffered their steepest downturns since the
1930s and dr[ove] the domestic economy into a steep and prolonged recession. The total
market value of publically-traded U.S. stocks slumped by more than $10 trillion from
October 2007 through February 2009.
Id. at 967.
16. See generally Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100
GEO. L.J. 1177, 1185–87 (2012) (exploring potential causes of the housing bubble that sparked the
financial crisis). The housing bubble formed during a period of easily available credit and rising
housing prices. Robert T. Miller, Morals in a Market Bubble, 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 113, 120
(2009). Housing prices increased by 188% over the course between 1997 and 2006. Levitin &
Wachter, supra, at 1179.
17. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 1, at xxiv (explaining that the panic
caused by the housing bubble’s collapse was ultimately responsible for the stock market’s
implosion and a world-wide recession).
18. See id. at xxiii–iv.
19. Id. at xxiv; see generally INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES:
A SUPPLEMENT TO THE FIFTH EDITION OF THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS MANUAL (2000) available
at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fd/2000/index.htm (explaining financial derivatives). The
investment banks created these financial instruments and derived their values from the
mortgage-backed securities. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 1, at xxiii. So,
when the underlying security lost value, the derivative also lost value, sending the stock market
into a tailspin. Id. at xxiv.
20. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 1, at xxiii.
21. See e.g., Rachelle Younglai et al., Financial Crises Caused by “Stupidity and Greed”:
Geithner, REUTERS, Apr. 25, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/26/us-usa-economy
-geithner-idUSBRE83P01P20120426.
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government policies are also to blame.22 During the latter part of the twentieth
century, government policies encouraged the consolidation of the financial
services industry into large banking conglomerates.23 Additionally, commercial
banks were authorized to securitize loans and underwrite or invest in
asset-backed securities, which permitted them to compete directly with
investment banks. 24 Regulators widely believed that the market would selfcorrect and that financial institutions could effectively police themselves
through market discipline and the banks’ internal risk models.25 However, this
regulatory environment failed to control the banks’ tendency to take
unreasonable risks, while ignoring harmful relationships between banks and
investors. 26 The financial institutions “made, bought, and sold mortgage
securities they never examined, did not care to examine, or knew to be
defective,” which exposed them to severe risk.27
The deregulation of financial institutions encouraged the mortgage industry
to issue risky mortgages under the securitization system because they were paid
based on the volume of the loans processed.28 Organizations tasked with the
regulation and oversight of mortgages and the housing industry, such as the
Federal Reserve, failed to stop these practices.29 This environment created a
moral hazard problem in which the banks, encouraged by the government and
regulators, took on risky bets.30 When the entire system collapsed, the federal
government faced the quandary of whether to allow the system to fail or to bail
out the financial industry.31 The federal government chose to save the financial
institutions, having determined that they were “too systematically important to
fail.”32

22. See infra Part I.A.1–2.
23. Wilmarth, supra note 15, at 969.
24. Id. at 987.
25. Id. at 1001–02. See also Andrew Crockett, Gen. Manager of the Bank for Int’l Settlements
and Chairman of the Fin. Stability Forum, Market Discipline and Fin. Stability (May 23–25, 2001),
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp010523.htm (defining market discipline as the “internal and
external governance mechanisms in a free-market economy in the absence of direct government
intervention,” and explaining the strengths and limitations of market discipline).
26. Wilmarth, supra note 15, at 971, 1024–26.
27. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 1, at xvii.
28. See MARTIN NEIL BAILY, ROBERT E. LITAN & MATTHEW S. JOHNSON, THE ORIGINS OF
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 20–21 (2008), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media
/research/files/papers/2008/11/origin%20crisis%20baily%20litan/11_origins_crisis_baily_litan.
pdf.
29. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 1, at xvii.
30. Id. at xxiv–xxv.
31. Id. at xvi.
32. Id.

764

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 63:759

2. Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities Fraud
The involvement of the investment banks in the RMBS scheme is considered
to have been a catalyst for the financial crisis.33 A RMBS is a security comprised
of various debts associated with mortgage loans. 34 There is inherent risk
associated with the purchase of such securities, and the government does not
protect investors from loss.35 This scheme began to unravel in 2007 when the
prices of homes began to decline.36 Until that point, the system had relied on
increasing home values and a steady stream of mortgage payments. 37 When
homeowners could no longer afford to make their growing mortgage payments
or refinance, “the losses . . . rushed through the pipeline” and affected every part
of the chain causing massive market losses.38
There were many instances of fraud associated with the RMBS scheme. First,
mortgage lenders made risky loans to people who likely could not afford to repay
the mortgage.39 Second, when packaging the mortgages into securities for sale
to investors, the banks mischaracterized the risk associated with the loans. 40
Third, there were instances of fraud in the rating of the RMBSs.41 The rating
33. Wilmarth, supra note 15, at 1043.
34. See id. at 984–89 (discussing the origins and evolution of RMBSs). In creating a RMBS,
a bank would originate consumer and corporate loans, package these loans into asset-backed
securities and collateralized debt obligations, create over-the-counter derivatives whose values
were derived from loans, and distribute the securities and other financial instruments to investors.
Id. at 995. The securitization of the residential mortgages allowed banks to increase their business
by lending to a larger number of consumers and commercial enterprises. Id. at 984. Banks relied
less on traditional deposits and had the opportunity to fund loans through the capital market. Id.
Through the securitization process, banks “converted illiquid loans into asset-backed securities []
that could be sold to investors,” which allowed banks to avoid the regulatory capital requirements.”
Id. at 985.
35. Insured or Not Insured?, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.gov/
consumers/consumer/information/fdiciorn.html (last updated Oct. 17, 2013).
36. Wilmarth, supra note 15, at 970 (explaining that “[w]hen home prices . . . collapsed in
2007, nonprime homeowners could not refinance, defaults skyrocketed, and the subprime financial
crisis began”).
37. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 1, at xxiv (“[E]ach step in the
mortgage securitization pipeline depended on the next step to keep demand going.”).
38. Id.
39. See David Reiss, Subprime Standardization: How Rating Agencies Allow Predatory
Lending to Flourish in the Secondary Mortgage Market, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 985, 997–1001
(2006) (discussing predatory lending practices to subprime borrowers). These predatory lending
practices took unfair advantage of borrowers, often using deception, fraud, or manipulation through
abusive loan terms. Id. at 998–1001.
40. See THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 1, at xxii.
41. See United States v. McGraw-Hill Co., No. CV 13–0779 DOC (JCGx), 2013 WL
3762259, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2013) (finding sufficient evidence of credit-rating fraud to
proceed with the case and, therefore, rejected the defendant’s motion to dismiss); see also THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 1, at xxv (noting that credit rating companies’
misrepresentation and fraud played a crucial role in the financial disaster); David A. Mass,
Comment, Policing the Ratings Agencies: The Case for Stronger Criminal Disincentives in the
Credit Rating Market, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1005, 1009–10 (2011) (arguing for
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agencies gave these subprime mortgage comprised securities very high ratings
to attract investors, but the underlying risk was not accounted for in the price of
the security.42 Along every step of the process, fraud occurred and incentives
encouraged risky lending, haphazard compositions of the securities, and the
inaccurate ratings of the securities to reflect the associated risk.
B. Effects from the Financial Crisis on Federally Insured Deposits and Banks
The banking industry, businesses, communities, and consumers were
devastated by the financial crisis. 43 By 2013, more than 400 financial
institutions had failed; several more required capital injections and other forms
of government aid “to remain solvent.”44 When the housing market collapsed
and the credit market froze, “hundreds of billions of dollars in losses in
mortgages and mortgage-related securities” threatened the viability of financial
institutions that had significant exposure to toxic mortgages, had invested
substantial funds in the RMBSs or similar assets, and had borrowed heavily
against these liabilities.45 In response to bank failures, the Federal Depository
Insurance Company (FDIC), through the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF),
provided massive amounts of capital to insure the deposits at these failed
banks.46 Between 2007 and 2008, the DIF reserves were depleted by over 63
percent.47 By the third quarter in 2009, the DIF “had a negative balance of $8.2
billion.” 48 As part of the Dodd-Frank Act, the standard maximum deposit
insurance amount increased from $100,000 to $250,000. 49 Regulators and
stronger criminal deterrence of credit rating fraud by requiring only a mens rea of recklessness in
financial fraud cases).
42. Wilmarth, supra note 15, at 1028–30. Investors relied on the credit ratings to accurately
access the risk associated with their investment. Id. at 1026.
43. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., REPORT TO CONGRESS:
COMPREHENSIVE STUDY ON THE IMPACT OF THE FAILURE OF INSURED DEPOSITORY
INSTITUTIONS ii (2013) available at http://www.fdicoig.gov/reports13%5C13-002EV.pdf.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1–2.
46. Deposit Insurance Fund, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.gov/
deposit/insurance/ (last updated Jan. 7, 2014) (“The primary purposes of the Deposit Insurance
Fund (DIF) are: (1) to insure the deposits and protect the depositors of insured banks and (2) to
resolve failed banks.”).
47. Damian Paletta, Congress Raises FDIC Limits, WALL ST. J., May 21, 2009,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB124276506015836059. At the end of 2007, the
deposit-insurance fund consisted of $52.4 billion, and by the end of 2008, it consisted of only $19
billion. Id.
48. Eric Dash, As Bank Failures Rise, Insurance Fund Falls Into Red, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25,
2009, at B4.
49. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, § 335(a),
124 Stat. 1376, 1540 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(E)). This increased limit “applies
per depositor, per insured depository institution for each account ownership category.” Press
Release, Fed. Reserve Ins. Corp., Basic FDIC Insurance Coverage Permanently Increased to
$250,000 Per Depositor (July 21, 2010), http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2010
/pr10161.html. The insured amount had been $100,000. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(E) (2012). See
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Congress intended the insurance increase to boost confidence in the banking
system as a means to assist the recovery.50
II. GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE: FINANCIAL FRAUD ENFORCEMENT TASK
FORCE AND THE USE OF THE FIRREA CIVIL PENALTIES PROVISION
A. History of FIRREA
In response to the Savings and Loan Crisis51, Congress enacted FIRREA to
recover the costs the FDIC incurred to meet its obligations on the insured
deposits depleted because of the crisis.52 FIRREA brought important reforms to
the system of insuring federally insured deposits and the regulations and
enforcement of the financial industry.53 Congress passed FIRREA as a means
“to control the ‘outright fraud and insider abuse’ that had pervaded the thrift
industry and that it found to have been a significant contributor to the [Savings

also Changes in FDIC Deposit Insurance Coverage, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP.,
http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/deposits/changes.html (last updated Jan. 1, 2013).
50. See Paletta, supra note 47; see also, Sandra Block, FDIC Deposit Insurance Limit Could
Bump Up to $250,000, USA TODAY, Oct. 1, 2008, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money
/industries/banking/2008-09-30-fdic-insurance_n.htm (explaining that Congress increased the
insurance amount to boost confidence in the banking system at a time when banks were failing due
to the financial crisis).
51. See 1 [An Examination of the Banking Crises of the 1980s and Early 1990s] FED. DEPOSIT
INS. CORP., HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES–LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 167–88 (1997), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/167_188.pdf (explaining the origins and outcome of
the Savings and Loan Crisis and its effect on the banking industry) [hereinafter HISTORY OF THE
EIGHTIES]. A savings and loan association, also known as a thrift, is a type of financial institution
“that primarily makes home-mortgage loans,” but also provides “checking accounts and [] other
bank services” to members. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 668 (4th Pocket ed. 2011). After
flourishing under post-World War II economic growth, in the 1970s and 1980s the Savings and
Loan (S&L) industry faced competition from investments promising higher returns from the higher
interest rates. Nicole Fradete et al., Project: Regulatory Reform: A Survey of the Impact of
Reregulation and Deregulation on Selected Industries and Sectors, How A Good Idea Went Wrong:
Deregulation and the Savings and Loan Crisis, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 643, 647 (1995). In an effort
to protect the S&L industry, the main source of funding for “home construction and purchasing,
which many would argue is the bedrock of a healthy national economy,” the government chose to
deregulate the industry. Id. This deregulation attracted investors and encouraged excessive
risk-taking because of the potential for large profits. HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES, supra at 179.
Additionally, it created an incentive structure that lead to “hundreds of [S&Ls] [making] a torrent
of bad loans,” that resulted in “a government takeover and bailout that ultimately cost taxpayers
over $120 billion.” Savings and Loan Associations, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.
com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/s/savings_and_loan_associations/.
52. Melinda M. Ward, FIRREA-Finally Resolved?, 67 UMKC L. REV. 407, 411 (1998).
53. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. 101-73,
103 Stat 183 (1989) (“An Act to reform, recapitalize, and consolidate the Federal deposit insurance
system, to enhance the regulatory and enforcement powers of Federal financial institution
regulatory agencies, and for other purposes.”). FIRREA was enacted to strengthen the financial
system by increasing accountability, lowering risky behaviors, and promoting more responsible
reform. Id.
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and Loan Crisis].” 54 The legislative history of FIRREA also shows that
Congress believed that the depositors and federal taxpayers put at risk by the
thrifts’ fraudulent behavior were the victims, and that Congress sought to protect
the depositors and taxpayers from future crises.55 Congress intended FIRREA
to give federal regulators a greater ability to regulate depository institutions and
to increase civil and criminal penalties for those who seek to defraud or damage
those institutions.56
B. FIRREA Civil Penalties Provision as a Valuable Enforcement Tool
In response to the financial crisis, the DOJ and other government agencies
have utilized various tools to prosecute fraud and bring civil actions against
institutions and persons involved in fraudulent schemes.57 Federal prosecutors
find FIRREA, the Savings and Loan era statute, particularly useful because it
provides leeway to impose heavy penalties on banks for alleged fraud.58
One of the many components of FIRREA is the civil penalties provision,
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1833a.59 In pertinent part, this provision permits the
Attorney General to commence civil actions to recover penalties from those who
violate, or conspire to violate “section 287, 1001, 1032, 1341 or 1343 of Title

54. United States v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d 438, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing
H.R. REP. NO. 101–54(I) at 294 (1989)).
55. See H.R. REP. NO. 101–54(I) at 301–01 (1989).
56. Charles L. O’Brien & Lisa M. Cavage, FIRREA: Retroactive Application, Due Process
Issues, Right-Duty Analysis and the Statute of Limitations, 108 BANKING L.J. 308, 308–09 (1991)
(examining the scope of regulatory power under FIRREA).
57. Jay Williams, Valarie Hays & Mir Ali, FIRREA: An Old Acronym is Turning into the
Government’s New Hammer on Banks and Financial Institutions, 129 BANKING L.J. 579, 583
(2012) (noting that the government’s “[r]enewed interest in FIRREA seems to have been sparked
in the wake of ‘Operation Stolen Dreams,’ a nationwide effort” of the Financial Fraud Enforcement
Task Force’s RMBS working group). In 2009, President Obama established the Financial Fraud
Enforcement Task Force to hold those involved in the financial crisis accountable and to prevent
exploitation of the current financial situation. See Exec. Order No. 13,519, 3 C.F.R. 271 (2009);
About the Task Force, FIN. FRAUD ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE, http://www.stop
fraud.gov/about.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2014). The Task Force is a coalition of federal
departments, agencies, and offices with law enforcement, investigative, and regulatory functions,
and is comprised of various working groups such as the Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities
Working Group. Id.; Report Residential Mortgage–Backed Securities Fraud, FIN. FRAUD
ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE, http://www.stopfraud.gov/rmbs.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2014).
58. Williams, supra note 57, at 579–80.
59. 12 U.S.C. § 1833a (2012).
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18 affecting a federally insured financial institution.”60 Section 1813 provides
the definitions for the chapter.61
The scope of FIRREA’s civil penalties provisions appears to be broad,
because it allows the government to commence civil actions based on a wide
variety of fraudulent activities, including those relating to mail, electronics,
banking, improper gifts, use of funds, and “making misrepresentations to the
government.” 62 The government may pursue civil penalties against alleged
violations of the enumerated criminal provisions when the conduct “affect[s]
federally insured financial institutions or involve[s] false statements to the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation [], the Department of Housing and Urban
Development [], and other federal entities.”63
The DOJ has found FIRREA to be a particularly valuable tool in its efforts to
fight financial fraud for a number of reasons.64 First, the government is held to
the less burdensome civil standard of proof even though the statute incorporates
a number of criminal statutes, such as mail and wire fraud.65 The less demanding
standard of proof, along with the grant of subpoena authority to DOJ civil
attorneys and the ability to disclose grand jury material to civil prosecutors,
allows government attorneys to prove financial fraud crimes more easily. 66
Additionally, FIRREA has a greater reach than other fraud statutes, such as the
False Claims Act,67 because FIRREA authorizes civil remedies even when fraud
60. Id. Sections (c)(1) and (3) do not include the modifying requirement that the enumerated
crime “[affect] a federally insured financial institution.” Id. This Comment will discuss only
section (c)(2). See id. Section (c)(2) enumerates the following predicate crimes: Making false,
fictitious, or fraudulent crimes in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 287; misrepresenting material facts to
the U.S. government in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001; hiding assets or property from conservators,
receivers, or liquidating agents in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1032; devising schemes to defraud or
swindle in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341; or, using wire, radio, or television to engages in fraud
that affects a federally insured financial institution in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. See 12 U.S.C.
§ 1833a(c)(2).
61. 12 U.S.C. § 1813 (2012).
62. Williams, supra note 57, at 580; see also 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(c)(2).
63. Williams, supra note 57, at 580; see also 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(c)(2).
64. See Andrew W. Schilling, Understanding FIRREA’s Reach: When Does Fraud “Affect”
a Financial Institution?, 99 BANKING REP. (BNA) 186, July 24, 2012, at 1, available at
http://www.buckleysandler.com/uploads/36/doc/understanding-firreas-reach.pdf.
65. See 12 U.S.C. § 1833a (holding the government to a “preponderance of the evidence”
standard rather than the stricter criminal “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard); see also Schilling,
supra note 64, at 2; Williams, supra note 57, at 580 (“FIRREA is a comparative walk in the park
for government attorneys compared to the rigorous burden of proof required in criminal cases and
the criminal discovery rules, which are focused largely on protecting a criminal defendant’s
rights.”).
66. See Schilling, supra note 64, at 2; Williams, supra note 57, at 579–80. As these
representatives of the banking industry highlight, the FIRREA civil penalties provision provides
the government a particularly effective tool as the government can “obtain hefty fines against banks
for alleged criminal acts while intentionally leveraging the benefits of civil law’s less rigorous
burden of proof and more generous discovery rules.” Williams, supra note 57, at 579.
67. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2012).
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is not necessarily directed at the U.S. Government. 68 This broad application
allows the DOJ to investigate and prosecute financial fraud, including fraud
associated with the RMBS industry. 69 Additionally, this provision serves to
strongly deters risky and potentially fraudulent conduct.70 Although FIRREA’s
civil penalties provision covers many criminal statutes, including the broadly
construed mail and wire fraud statutes 71 , under § 1833a(c)(2) there is a
limitation: the fraud must “affect[] a federally insured financial institution.”72
C. Similar Provisions Requiring Effects on Financial Institutions
There are other federal criminal statutes that also provide a limiting phrase to
the application of wire or mail fraud similar to the one found in 12 U.S.C.

68. Schilling, supra note 64, at 2. Conversely, under the False Claims Act, a defendant can
be held liable if he submits false or fraudulent claims for payment to the U.S. Government. 31
U.S.C. § 3729 (2012).
69. Schilling, supra note 64, at 2.
70. Id.; see also Williams, supra note 57, at 582 (explaining that these provisions give the
government a “tactical advantage[] . . . to stage FIRREA attacks against virtually any financial
institution . . . accused of fraud or related misconduct”).
71. The offense of mail fraud prohibits activities in which a person utilizes the U.S. Mail
system in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012). The offense of wire fraud
prohibits using electronic communications or communication facilities to commit fraudulent
conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012). Accordingly, in order to convict someone of mail or wire fraud:
[T]he government must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant perpetrated:
(i) a scheme to defraud that includes a material deception; (ii) with the intent to defraud;
(iii) while using the mails, private commercial carriers, and/or wires in furtherance of
that scheme; (iv) that did result or would have resulted in the loss of money or property
or the deprivation of honest services.
William M. Sloan, Mail and Wire Fraud, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 905, 908 (2011). Further, a wire
fraud conviction “also requires proof that the communication at issue crossed state lines.” Id. The
mail fraud statute was implemented “with the initial purpose of securing the integrity of United
States Postal Service.” Id. at 906. The development of new technologies have led to the expansion
of “the mail and wire fraud statutes . . . to cover a number of modes of communication such as
facsimile, telex, modem, and Internet transmissions.” Id. at 907 (footnotes omitted).
These provisions have been widely interpreted and applied to a number of fraudulent
activities and conduct. Id. at 905–08 (providing a detailed overview of the mail and wire fraud
offenses and the extent to which prosecutors have utilized them). Prosecutors find the mail and
wire fraud statutes to be “powerful tools” because they allow for the prosecution of “a wide range
of conduct.” Id. at 905–06. These laws also serve as “‘stopgap’ device[s]” in that they allow
prosecutors to pursue “new forms of fraud” until legislation is passed that criminalizes the conduct.
Id. at 906. These statutes allow the federal prosecutors to pursue a “full range of consumer frauds,
stock frauds, land frauds, bank frauds, insurance frauds, and commodity frauds, but [also] . . . such
areas as blackmail, counterfeiting, election fraud, and bribery.” Id. at 907 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771,
772 (1980)). The mail and wire fraud laws are also used as predicate offenses to bring a claim
under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). Id. at 907; see also 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2012) (criminalizing RICO).
72. 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(c)(2) (2012).
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§ 1833a(c)(2).73 However, in none of these other statutes must the crime affect
a federally insured financial institution.74 In determining the appropriate scope
of the phrase “affecting a federally insured financial institution,” parties and
courts have relied on the language of these criminal statutes to form the basis of
their analysis. 75 In Section 961 (I)(1) of FIRREA, the Act established an
extended statute of limitations for financial institution offenses.76 Courts have
examined the applicability and scope of the phrase “if the offense affects a
financial institution.”77 The term “financial institution” is defined by 18 U.S.C.
§ 20, which is applicable to the sections included in Title 18 of the United States
Code.78
1. Broad Application to Fraudulent Conduct
a. Relationship Between a Parent and its Wholly-Owned Subsidiary
Courts have examined the extent of the alleged effects within the defendant’s
corporate structure. In United States v. Pelullo,79 the defendant was convicted
of forty-nine counts of wire fraud and one count of racketeering.80 Pellulo was
the chief executive officer of a publicly held corporation, The Royale Group,
Ltd.81 Six hotels, owned by the Royale Group, borrowed $13.5 million from
FCA Mortgage Corporation, which was “a wholly owned subsidiary of
American Savings and Loan Association.”82 The loan permitted Royale to draw
loan money to pay for costs associated with the renovation work on the hotels.83
Pellulo misrepresented the amount of money that was needed for the
renovations, in order to receive greater payments from American.84 In regards
73. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 225 (2012) (defining the crime of a “continuing financial crimes
enterprise” to include series of mail or wire frauds “affecting a financial institution”); 18 U.S.C.
§ 982(a)(2)(A) (2012) (authorizing forfeiture for certain fraud offenses “affecting a financial
institution”); 18 U.S.C. § 3293 (2012) (extending that statute of limitation for claims of mail or
wire fraud is extended from five to ten years if the offense “affects a financial institution”).
74. See supra note 73.
75. See infra Part III.
76. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. 101-73,
§ 961, 103 Stat 183, 499–500 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3293 (2012)) (increasing the criminal
penalties for certain financial institution offenses).
77. See e.g., United States v. Pelullo, 964 F.3d 193, 215–16 (3d Cir. 1992) (examining how
18 U.S.C. § 3293 should be interpreted when deciding if a fraud “affects a financial institution”).
78. See 18 U.S.C. § 20 (2012).
79. 964 F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 1992).
80. Id. at 197.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 197–98.
84. Id. at 198. Under the terms of the loan for the hotels, $10 million had been earmarked for
the costs of buying the hotels and approximately $6.2 million from the loan would be used for
renovations. Id. at 197. American would keep the renovation funds and disburse them to the
defendant upon submission of an itemized assessment of costs. Id. at 197–98.
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to his wire fraud charges, the government “alleged that Pelullo defrauded
American, Royale and Royale’s shareholders of approximately $1.6 million by
submitting false documentation in connection with certain draw requests on the
project,” and “divert[ed] cash from one of [Royale’s] subsidiaries to repay a debt
Pelullo owed to a loanshark connected with the Philadelphia mafia.”85 Pelullo
argued that the wire fraud charges should have been barred because “FCA
Mortgage, a wholly-owned subsidiary of American, and not American, was the
party to the . . . loan agreement and hence the ten-year limitations period [was]
inapplicable.” 86 In determining whether the charges were barred, the court
examined the applicability of 18 U.S.C. § 3293(2), which extends the statute of
limitations by ten years when the “applicable offense affects a financial
institution.”87 Pelullo argued that the extended limitations period did not apply
to subsidiaries based on the definitional distinctions between a “financial
institution” and a “subsidiary,” which indicated “Congress’ intent to treat
financial institutions and subsidiaries differently for purposes of the statute of
limitations.”88
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that “fraud perpetrated
against a [parent] financial institution’s wholly owned subsidiary” can be said
to “affect the parent.” 89 In Pelullo, the subsidiary was a mortgage lending
company, which was wholly-owned by its parent company, a savings and loan
association.90 The Third Circuit rejected the argument that the fraud must be
directly aimed at a financial institution. 91 Further, the court distinguished
Pelullo from a potential scenario in which the effect on the parent might be
unreasonably remote, where “the fraud was directed against a customer of the

85. Id. at 198.
86. Id. at 214.
87. Id.
88. Id. As the defendant observed, the term “financial institution” includes the following
definitions: “an insured depository institution,” 12 U.S.C. § 1813(c)(2) (2012), and “a depository
institution holding company,” § 1813(w)(1). Pelullo, 964 F.3d at 214 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 20(1) (2012)). The defendant highlighted that a subsidiary is defined
as “any service corporation owned in whole or part by an insured depository institution or any
subsidiary of such a service corporation.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 12 U.S.C.
§ 1813(w)(4)(B) (2012)).
89. Id. at 215 (disregarding the defendant’s argument that fraud cannot affect a parent
company when the fraud is perpetrated against its wholly owned subsidiary).
90. Id. at 197. A savings and loan (S&L) association is a “financial institution—often
organized and chartered like a bank—that primarily makes home-mortgage loans but also [usually]
maintains checking accounts and provides other banking services.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1461 (9th ed. 2009). By the late 1980s, S&L associations had become a dominant players in the
residential mortgage and secondary mortgage markets. Ward, supra note 52, at 410. This dominant
position resulted from Congress’ policy of promoting homeownership. Id. However, the resulting
S&L Crisis, caused by the change of monetary policy from the Federal Reserve and the
highly-risky reaction of the S&L industry, resulted in the diminished importance of S&L
associations in the current mortgage lending environment. Id.
91. Pelullo, 964 F.3d at 216.
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depository institution which was then prejudiced in its dealings with the
institution.”92 Ultimately, the court reasoned that “[u]nder the facts of this case,
it would have been impossible for Pelullo to have intended to defraud [the
subsidiary] without intending to defraud [the parent].”93
This distinction between a parent and its wholly-owned subsidiary was also at
issue in United States v. Bouyea.94 The defendant had been convicted of “wire
fraud for . . . fraudulently obtain[ing] $150,000 . . . from the Center Capital
Corporation . . . in a manner affecting Centerbank, a financial institution of
which Center Capital is a wholly-owned subsidiary.”95 On appeal, the defendant
argued the government could not prove that defrauding the wholly-owned
subsidiary “‘affected a financial institution’ within the meaning of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3293(2).”96
Like the Third Circuit’s decision in Pelullo, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that even though the subsidiary was not itself a financial
institution the defendant’s fraudulent conduct directed at the wholly-owned
subsidiary “affected a financial institution.”97 Important for the court’s “affects”
analysis was the evidence that the subsidiary borrowed money from its parent
corporation.98 Consequently, the Second Circuit found that “the effect of the
wire fraud on [the financial institution] was sufficiently direct so as to
support . . . the jury’s [] that the wire fraud affected a financial institution.”99
b. Effects Do Not Need to be Negative or Directed
Defendants have attempted to evade FIRREA’s extended statute of limitations
by arguing that the effects on a financial institution had to be negative. For
instance, in United States v. Serpico,100 the defendant argued that in order for
fraud to have affected a financial institution, the financial institution must have
experienced negative effects and could not have been an active participant in the
scheme. 101 The defendant, Serpico, managed a member unions’ money, but

92. Id.
93. Id. at 217.
94. 152 F.3d 192, 194 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 195. As explained in the Court’s decision, “[t]he defrauded institution, Center
Capital, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Centerbank, which is a financial institution,” but, “Center
Capital is not itself a financial institution within the meaning of the statute.” Id.
98. Id. The subsidiary, Center Capital, had borrowed the money for the transaction from its
parent, Centerbank. Id. Evidence showed that Centerbank was affected by Center Capital’s
$150,000 loss due to the defendant’s fraud. Id.
99. Id. (citations omitted). The Bouyea court discussed the Pelullo court’s hypothetical to
explain what actions would be unreasonably remote. Id. (discussing the prejudiced customer
hypothetical); see also supra text accompanying note 92.
100. 320 F.3d 691 (7th Cir. 2003).
101. Id. at 691–95.
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misappropriated the funds through multiple loan and kickback schemes. 102
Appealing his wire fraud conviction, the defendant argued that the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit should reverse his conviction, because his
fraudulent acts “did not ‘affect’ a financial institution.”103 Further, the defendant
contented that even if financial institutions were affected, the banks willfully
participated and benefited from the scheme.104
The Seventh Circuit rejected the defendant’s argument that effects on the
financial institutions must be negative and direct.105 Instead, the court held that
a financial institution is affected even if the institution benefits from the fraud.106
Also, the court found that active “participation in a scheme [that] is in a bank’s
best interest does not necessarily mean that [the bank] is not exposed to
additional risks and is not affected.”107 The Court held that the increased risk of
loss is sufficient to find that the fraud affected a financial institution. 108
Increased risk can be characterized as a bank making risky loans that it never
would have made absent the fraudulent scheme.109 The illegality of the kickback
scheme itself increased the financial institution’s risk.110
In United States v. Ohle,111 the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York applied the holdings of Bouyea and Serpico to determine whether a
financial institution had been affected by the alleged fraud when it actively
participated in the scheme, was not the object of the fraud, and was not directly
affected by the fraud. 112 The government charged the defendant with tax
evasion and fraud offenses and alleged that the defendant created tax shelters to
cheat the federal government out of millions of dollars. 113 The scheme was
profitable for all participants as it generated fee income and bonuses. 114
However, the scheme significantly increased the bank’s risk and resulted in
actual losses in the form of settlements and attorney’s fees.115
102. Id. at 693. Under the “loan-for-deposits” scheme, the defendant had received
inappropriately favorable terms and conditions on personal loans in exchange for depositing large
amounts of the Union’s funds in several banks. Id. Under the hotel loan kickback scheme,
defendant loaned union funds to a group that needed a mortgage in order to obtain financing to
construct a hotel. Id. Because the developers obtained this mortgage, Mid-City Bank agreed to
give the developers a loan for the hotel construction. Id.
103. Id. at 694.
104. Id. at 695.
105. Id. at 694.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 695 (internal quotation marks omitted).
108. Id. at 694.
109. Id. at 695.
110. Id.
111. 678 F. Supp. 2d 215 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
112. Id. at 228–29.
113. Id. at 218.
114. Id. at 219.
115. Id. at 229.
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The defendant did not contest that the bank was a financial institution; rather,
he argued that § 3293(2) did not apply because the bank had been “an active
participant in the fraud, not the object of the fraud, and not directly affected by
the fraud.”116 The court, similar to Serpico, interpreted the statute broadly,117
and determined that even though a financial institution willingly participated in
a fraudulent scheme, the institution’s participation did not mean that it was not
negatively affected. 118 Further, the court found that, although the financial
institution need not be the object of the fraud, the “effect on the financial
institution [must] be ‘sufficiently direct’” in order to apply the extended statute
of limitations.119
c. Increased Risk of Loss Enough to Constitute an Effect
Courts also determined the kind and degree of the effects that would be
sufficient to find a defendant liable under the statute. In United States v.
Mullen,120 the defendants defrauded the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) by obtaining loans insured by the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) through the use of false information on loan
applications. 121 The defendants used two mortgage companies that were
wholly-owned subsidiaries of federally insured banks in their scheme.122 This
scheme heightened the “risk of loss” for both the lender and its parent financial
institution, because it caused the lender to loan borrowers more money than they
could actually pay back.123
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit concluded that the “increased
risk of loss [was] plainly a material, detrimental effect on a financial institution”
and was sufficient to find that the fraud affected a financial institution.124 The
court recognized that there might be a point where the effects on a financial

116. Id. at 228.
117. Id. at 229 (adopting the Second Circuit’s holding in Bouyea that gives the statute a broad
application).
118. Id. at 228.
119. Id. at 229 (citing United States v. Bouyea, 152 F.3d 192, 195 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding that
Bank A was directly affected because it was exposed to substantial risk and experienced actual
losses).
120. 613 F.3d 1273 (10th Cir. 2010).
121. Id. at 1276. The defendants would create fake documents for prospective homebuyers to
help buyers support their applications for mortgage loans. Id.
122. Id. at 1279.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1278–79 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Seventh Circuit found this
reasoning to serve the statute’s purpose of deterring fraudulent conduct, including fraud on financial
institutions. Id. at 1279 (citing United States v. Serpico, 320 F.3d 691, 694–95 (7th Cir. 2003)).
The court also pointed to other cases where it had found that the potential risk of loss to a financial
institution was sufficient to prove a fraudulent scheme. Id. (citing United States v. Swanson, 360
F.3d 1155, 1161 (10th Cir. 2004); United States v. Young, 952 F.2d 1252, 1257 (10th Cir. 1991)).
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institution become too attenuated and ancillary such that “it does not in any
meaningful sense ‘affect’ the institution.”125
In United States v. Ghavami,126 the defendants were charged with wire fraud
for schemes to defraud investors of municipal bonds and various government
departments. 127 The complaint alleged that defendants, who worked for a
financial services company, colluded with other bidders as well as “third-party
broker[s] to manipulate and control the bidding process in exchange for
kickback payments.”128 The government argued that a financial institution is
affected when it suffers a risk of financial loss or an actual financial loss in the
form of settlements or non-prosecution agreements.129 In contrast, the defendant
argued that when the benefits a financial institution receives from the fraudulent
schemes outweighs the negative effects, the statute does not apply. 130 The
defendant also argued that settlements and non-prosecution agreements do not
have any bearing on whether the financial institution was or was not affected by
the charged conduct.131
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York adopted the
rulings of the Seventh and Tenth Circuits, holding that exposure to a risk of loss
alone is sufficient to constitute an effect under § 3293(2).132 It ruled that the
application of § 3293(2) was not barred just because a financial institution was
not “the [direct] object or victim of the scheme to defraud.”133 The court also
rejected the defendant’s netbenefit argument as it would “perversely incentivize
financial institutions to participate in frauds in which they expect[ed] to earn a
net benefit.”134 Further, the court found that actual losses could come in the
form of settlement costs and attorney’s fees.135

125. Mullins, 613 F.3d at 1278. Merely using the financial institution to transfer funds that did
not create risk of loss to the institution is too attenuated. Id. (citing United States v. Ubakanma,
215 F.3d 421, 426 (4th Cir. 2000)).
126. No. 10 Cr. 1217(KMW), 2012 WL 2878126, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2012).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at *4. The Government argued that the losses the financial institution experienced
included money lost in settlements with various regulatory agencies, as well as attorney’s fees for
negotiating non-prosecution agreements with DOJ’s Antitrust Division to avoid criminal penalties.
Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at *5–6 (citing United States v. Bouyea, 152 F.3d 192, 195 (2d Cir. 1998) (per
curiam)). The court adopted the Second Circuit’s approach to the “affects” analysis. Id.
133. Id. at *5 (citing United States v. Ohle, 678 F. Supp. 2d 215, 228-29 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)); see
also United States v. Serpico, 320 F.3d 691, 695 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding, like the Ghavami court,
that § 3293(2) applies if the financial institution is exposed to higher risk, regardless of whether the
institution benefitted from the fraud).
134. Ghavami, 2012 WL 2878126, at *6.
135. Id. (citing United States v. Rubin/Chambers, Dunhill Ins. Servs., 831 F. Supp. 2d 779,
781-82 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)).
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Therefore, courts have applied the FIRREA civil penalties provision broadly.
Under these cases, financial institution can be affected either directly or via its
parent or subsidiary. It can also be affected when the financial institution
benefitted from or was harmed by a fraudulent scheme, and when it experienced
even the mere the risk of loss.
2. Mere Utilization of a Financial Institution is Insufficient
Despite broad rulings with respect to increased risk constituting an “effect,”
courts have so far been unwilling to extend the statute of limitations to situations
in which the financial institutions were merely utilized in the fraudulent scheme.
In United States v. Agne,136 in an issue of first impression for the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit, the court held that the defendant’s use of fraudulent
documents to draw on the buyer’s funds through a letter of credit did not “affect”
a financial institution and, therefore, did not extend the statute of limitations for
wire fraud charges.137
After examining the transaction, the First Circuit found that the issuing bank
did not suffer “actual financial loss and experienced no realistic prospect of
loss.”138 The Court found that “at minimum there need[ed] to be some impact
on the financial institution to support a conviction,” and, in Agne, “the
consequence to the bank, if any, [was] too remote to sustain the conviction” for
wire fraud.139 The Court rejected the government’s suggestion that the potential
loss of clients and a damaged reputation would be sufficient to find that the fraud
affected a financial institution.140 The court relied on the Pelullo decision to
determine the limit of the statute’s reach.141
In a U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit case, United States v.
Ubakanma,142 the defendant was convicted of wire fraud relating to a scheme in
which he used fake contracts to solicit victims to invest money in the Nigerian
government.143 The defendant utilized financial institutions to wire funds in and
136. 214 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2000).
137. Id. at 51–53. Under the letter of credit, the buyer, R.G. Engineering, said it would pay the
bank for all withdrawals by the beneficiary, and R.G. Engineering offered its assets as security for
drafts. Id. at 52. Under this financing structure, the issuing bank is protected from suit for
wrongfully honoring a letter of credit. Id. For more explanation about letters of credit, see
Christopher Leon, Letters of Credit: A Primer, 45 MD. L. REV. 432, 462 (1986) (providing an
explanation of a letter of credit transactions).
138. Agne, 214 F.3d at 53. The funds in the defendant’s account remained adequate during
the transaction, and the letter of credit transaction protected the issuing bank from risk. Id.
139. Id. at 52 (“Even assuming, without deciding, that being exposed to a risk of loss is
sufficient to ‘affect’ a bank, within the ordinary meaning of that term, we cannot agree with the
district court that this defendant created such a risk.”).
140. Id. at 52–53 (explaining that reading a criminal statute so broadly as to encompass the
mere possibility of damage would be improper).
141. Id. at 52.
142. 215 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2000).
143. Id. at 423.
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out of various accounts; however, the government did not present any evidence
that the fraud intended to harm or actually harmed the financial institutions.144
The Fourth Circuit held that the mere utilization of a financial institution,
without actual or risk of harm, was insufficient to find that the defendant’s fraud
“affected” a financial institution.145
These cases are illustrative for the interpretation of the civil penalties
provision of FIRREA, because they developed the courts’ jurisprudence
regarding the ways in which a financial institution could be affected by fraud.
III. FIRREA IN POST-FINANCIAL CRISIS ENVIRONMENT
A. Effects on a Federally Insured Financial Institution
In resolving an issue of first impression, the court in United States v. Bank of
N.Y. Mellon146 held that “a federally insured financial institution may be held
civilly liable [under FIRREA] for allegedly engaging in fraudulent conduct
‘affecting’ that same institution.”147 The government argued that the defendants
defrauded the bank’s customers by misrepresenting the bank’s ability to execute
foreign exchange trade pricing. 148 The government alleged that the bank
experienced the following negative consequences as a result of the fraudulent
scheme: actual loses in attorney’s fees, the prospect of civil liability, loss of
clients, reputational harm, and the bank was “forc[ed] [] to accept a less
profitable business model.”149
The defendant argued two theories on the limitations of the “affecting”
clause. 150 First, the defendant contended that the federally insured financial
institution must be the victim of fraud directed at that institution.151 Second, the
defendant argued that the “affecting” clause could cover indirect harm, but only
if the harm is caused by a third party. 152 In other words, a bank could not
indirectly harm itself.153

144. Id. at 426.
145. Id.
146. 941 F. Supp. 2d 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
147. Id. at 443 (“In fact, this decision marks the first occasion upon which a court has been
called to interpret the meaning of the phrase ‘affecting a federally insured financial institution’
under [section 951 of FIRREA].”).
148. Id. at 442. For an explanation of foreign exchange trade, see Stephen C. Veltri, Should
Foreign Exchange Be “Foreign” to Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code?, 27 CORNELL
INT’L L.J. 343, 343–44, 350–51 (1994) (arguing for a narrow interpretation of Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code to confine its scope to the sales of goods and not the foreign exchange
market).
149. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 458.
150. Id. at 451.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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The U.S. District Court rejected the defendant’s arguments that a financial
institution must be victimized or at least an innocent bystander in order to
impose the civil penalty. 154 The court held that the financial institution’s
participation in the fraud does not preclude the possibility that it can be affected
by the fraud.155 Further, the court determined that the bank’s possible profits do
not neutralize any negative effects from the fraudulent conduct.156
First, the court rejected the defendant’s textual arguments based on the
language of the provision.157 The court found that if Congress had intended the
statute to apply only when financial institutions were victimized, it would have
expressly stated so in the language of the statute.158 The court also rejected the
defendant’s argument that the negative effects might be outweighed by the
institution’s profits as such a rule “would perversely incentivize financial
institutions to participate in frauds in which they expect to earn a net benefit,
which is behavior that the statute seeks to discourage.”159
Further, the court dismissed the defendant’s statutory structure argument,
finding that, if anything, the structure buttresses a broader reading of the statutes
provisions.160 The court suggested that the statutory structure indicated that the
provision was intended to have a broader application by pointing out that the
applicable section of FIRREA was entitled “Civil Penalties for Violations
Involving Financial Institutions.” 161 Finally, the court also emphasized
Congress’s intent to protect federally insured deposits from risk associated with
fraudulent behavior.162 The Court determined that the text and structure of the
provision clearly supported the government’s argument that the provision has a
broad application, and the evidence of legislative intent failed to dispel such a
finding.163 Nonetheless, the Court remained “mindful that the effects must be
‘sufficiently direct’” 164 and that at some point, the defendant’s fraudulent

154. Id. at 456–57.
155. Id. at 457.
156. Id. at 460.
157. Id. at 451.
158. Id. at 460.
159. Id. (internal citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Ghavami, No. 10 Cr.
1217(KMW), 2012 WL 2878126, at *6 (S.D.N.Y July 13, 2012)).
160. Id. at 452–53.
161. Id. at 454 (“Indeed, that ‘affecting’ might mean something closer to ‘involving’ is
supported by the heading of the subtitle. Section 1833a came from Section 951 of FIRREA, which
was the only section of Subtitle E of Title IX of FIRREA. Subtitle E was entitled ‘Civil Penalties
for Violations Involving Financial Institutions.’”).
162. Id. at 443 (noting that the purpose of the statute was to lower risk to federally insured
deposits, which naturally would include risk created by the institution’s own risk-increasing
fraudulent activity). The court also cited the statute’s legislative history, in which Congress
advocated for more supervision of savings and loan associations to prevent risky conduct. Id. at
455–45 (citing H.R. Rep. 101-54(I), at 301).
163. Id. at 463.
164. Id. at 459–60 (quoting United States v. Bouyea, 152 F.3d 192, 195 (2d Cir. 1998)).
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conduct would become “so attenuated, so remote, [and] so indirect” that it would
not be considered to “affect the [financial] institution.”165
In United States v. Countrywide Financial Corp.,166 the government alleged
that the defendants committed fraudulent origination loan practices in an effort
to increase its revenue from the sale of loans to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.167
When the financial crisis caused the value of the loans to drop drastically, Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac were no longer able to meet their financial obligations,
and the government initiated the conservatorship process, which eliminated the
investments of preferred shareholders, including many federally insured
banks.168
The government made two arguments regarding the effects on financial
institutions.169 First, the government argued that, under the self-affecting theory,
the defendants’ fraudulent loan origination practices caused Countrywide’s
parent, Bank of America N.A, a federally insured financial institution, to lose
billions of dollars in legal settlements with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 170
This greatly affected Bank of America and its shareholders.171 Second, under
the derivative effects theory, the government argued that the defendants’
misconduct affected those federally insured banks whose investments in Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac were wiped out as a result of the loan defaults.172 The
defendants dismissed both theories and argued that such a broad reading of the
FIRREA statute would result in limitless liability, contrary to existing judicial
precedent.173
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York held that the
sale of loans to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac affected a federally insured
financial institution under the self-effect theory.174 The court found the plain
language of the statute to be dispositive in determining the scope of the term
“affects” and dismissed the defendants’ structural and legislative history
165. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Mullins, 613 F.3d 1273,
1278 (10th Cir. 2010)).
166. No. 12 Civ. 1422(JSR), 2013 WL 4437232 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2013).
167. Id. at *1.
168. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 2013 WL 4437232, at *4. The federally insured community
banks had invested in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac stock because it was widely believed that they
were safe investments. Id.
169. Id. at *5.
170. Id. at *5–6.
171. Id.
172. Id.; see also Stephen F.J. Ornstein, Matthew S. Yoon & John P. Holahan, Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac Conservatorship and Liquidity Support, 62 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 52, 52–
53 (2008) (explaining the conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac following the financial
crisis); 2008-2013 Strategic Plan: Receivership Management, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., (last
updated Nov. 21, 2008), http://www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/strategic/receivership.html
(explaining the receivership management process for failed financial institutions under the FDIC).
173. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 2013 WL 4437232, at *5–6.
174. Id. at *5.
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arguments.175 Importantly, the Court suggested that there might be a limit to the
application of the civil penalties provision.176
Acknowledging the defendants’ arguments about the derivative effects, the
court noted that the statute does not include “the modifying language ‘directly
or indirectly’ that [Congress] typically employs to reach derivative effects.”177
In this case, however, the court determined that the derivative effects on the
federally insured banks that held investments in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
were “both substantial and foreseeable, the classic components of proximate
cause.”178 However, the Court did not resolve whether the derivative effects
would be sufficient to constitute a violation of the FIRREA civil penalties
provision.179
In United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 180 another case involving
mortgage fraud, the government alleged fraud in the origination and
underwriting practices of a residential mortgage lender for government-insured
home mortgage loans, which affected HUD.181 The government further alleged
that the defendant, a federally insured financial institution, experienced an
increased risk of harm and suffered actual harm as a result of its own fraudulent
conduct.182 The government contended that the defendant’s fraud allowed it to
make loans to borrowers while disregarding regulations put in place by HUD,
which created “a higher risk of default.” 183 This resulted in the defendant’s
indemnification of HUD for hundreds of loans.184 Additionally, the government
alleged that the bank was exposed to substantial legal liability and noteworthy
legal expenditures.185 The defendant argued against the self-affecting theory of
the statute, stating that it contradicted the plain text, structure, and intent of the
statute.186
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York held that the
plain text of the statute supports a reading that a financial institution can affect
itself.187 Following its decisions in Bank of N.Y. Mellon and Countrywide, the
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at *5–6.
178. Id. at *6.
179. Id.
180. No. 12 Civ. 7527(JMF), 2013 WL 5312564 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2013).
181. Id. at *1–2.
182. Id.
183. Id. at *29.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at *28.
187. Id. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York relied on its decision
in Countrywide, where it held that “the plain language of section 1833a(c)(2) . . . is as unambiguous
as it is dispositive,” and thus a federally insured financial institution may violate FIRREA by
conduct that affects itself. United States v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 12 Civ. 1422(JSR), 2013
WL 4437232, at *5–6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2013).

2014]

A Limited Interpretation of 12 U.S.C. § 1833a

781

court determined that “an institution that participates in a fraud may also be
affected by [the fraud] within the meaning of [the provision].” 188 The court
found that, by exposing itself to considerable liability through a risk of default
on the loans and the risk of litigation, the defendant’s fraud affected itself, a
financial institution, in violation of the FIRREA provision.189
IV. INTERPRETING THE FIRREA CIVIL PENALTIES PROVISION
A. Text of the Statute Supports a Limited Application
When interpreting a statute, one first looks to its text. 190 The courts have
defined “affect” to mean “‘to act upon’ as in ‘to produce an effect ... upon,’ ‘to
produce a material influence upon or alteration in,’ or possibly ‘to have a
detrimental influence on.’” 191 These literal dictionary definitions support a
natural reading of the phrase “affecting a federally insured financial
institution.”192 Therefore, the range of effects the courts have reached through
this interpretation of “affecting” appears to be supported by the statute’s plain
meaning. 193 The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
188. Wells Fargo Bank, 2013 WL 5312564, at *28 (citing United States v. Bank of N.Y.
Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d 438, 456–58 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)); see also Countrywide Fin. Corp., 2013
WL 4437232, at *5–6.
189. Id. at *28–29.
190. See Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk, 131 S. Ct. 1885, 1891 (2011)
(citing Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 169, 175 (2009); Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer,
513 U.S. 179, 187 (1995)) (interpreting the statute in question by looking to its plain meaning and
providing all undefined terms their ordinary construction); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A.
GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 53–58 (2012). Two of the
fundamental principles of interpretation are (1) “[e]very application of a text to particular
circumstances entails interpretation,” id. at 53, and (2) “[t]he words of a governing text are of
paramount concern, and what they convey, in their context, is what the text means,” id. at 56.
191. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 451 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 35 (1993)).
192. 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(c)(2) (2012). Under the ordinary-meaning canon of statutory
interpretation, “[w]ords are to be understood in their ordinary everyday meanings—unless the
context indicates that they bear a technical sense.” SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 190, at 69.
193. See Schilling, supra note 64, at 1 (explaining the range of situations in which courts have
held that fraud affected a financial institution). The courts in financial fraud cases in the
post-financial crisis environment have adopted this plain meaning of “affects” in its decisions. See
supra Part III. There are many “affects” theories throughout these cases. See supra Part III. Under
a “Direct Effects” theory, a court would find that the FIRREA civil penalties provision covers a
criminal action purposefully directed at a financial institution. 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(c). Although,
this is the most basic reading of the statutory provision, parties have argued over whether the effects
must be negative in order to justify the use of the provision. See United States v. Bouyea, 152 F.3d
192, 195 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (holding that the statute’s application is not limited to
circumstances in which the financial institution is the object or victim of fraud scheme). For
instance, defendants contend that for the effects on a financial institution to be negative, the
financial institution must have been the object or target of the fraud. See id. at 195. This “Negative
Direct Effects” or the “Victimization” theory suggests that the civil penalties provision only applies
if the direct effects cause the financial institution to suffer some harm as a result of the fraud. See
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found this to be a broad definition, and that Congress must have intended to
apply this provision to a wide variety of fraudulent activity.194 If Congress had
wanted to limit the application of the provision to fraud that victimizes an
institution, as argued by the defendant, Congress would have included limiting
language. 195 Any limitation on the statutes applicability is “absent from the
plain language of the statute.”196 However, the scope of the “affects” language
is necessarily limited to those effects that are reasonably foreseeable. 197
Typically, Congress includes the language of “directly or indirectly” when it
intends for a statute to apply to derivative effects.198 This language is notably
absent from the text of FIRREA’s civil penalties provision and courts have not
ruled decisively on whether these effects are sufficient to constitute liability
under the statute.199 The fraud itself must cause the effects on the federally
insured financial institution. 200 Contrary to the various court holdings that

id. Courts have consistently rejected this theory because the fraud could, and often does, benefit
the financial institution. See, e.g., United States v. Serpico, 320 F.3d 691, 694–95 (7th Cir. 2003)
(explaining that the mere fact that participation in a scheme benefits the bank’s does not necessarily
mean that the bank is not exposed to additional risks and is not “affected”). To hold otherwise
would encourage the financial institutions to pursue fraudulent activities as long as they made profit
or other gains. See United States v. Ghavami, No. 10 Cr. 1217(KMW), 2012 WL 2878126, at *6
(S.D.N.Y July 13, 2012). The courts have also held that under a “Self-Affecting” theory, a financial
institution is not immune from the civil penalties provision if its actions affect itself; instead, courts
find that the word “affects” can be reflexive, and if a financial institution allegedly commits an
enumerated crime and it affects itself, the financial institution can be liable under the provision.
See Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 461–62; Countrywide Fin. Corp., 2013 WL 4437232,
*5.
194. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 451.
195. Id.
196. See United States v. Daugerdas, No. S3 09 Cr. 581(WHP), 2011 WL 6020113, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2011).
197. See Countrywide Fin. Corp., 2013 WL 4437232, at *6; see also United States v. Ohle,
678 F. Supp. 2d 215, 228–29 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). Under the “Derivative Effects” theory, the alleged
fraud can cause indirect effects sufficient to establish liability under the statute if those effects were
reasonably foreseeable. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 2013 WL 4437332, at *6.
198. See Countrywide Fin. Corp., 2013 WL 4437332, at *6 (internal quotation marks omitted).
199. Id. The text of § 1833a(c)(2) reads: “This section applies to a violation of, or a conspiracy
to violate . . . section 287, 1001, 1032, 1341 or 1343 of title 18 affecting a federally insured financial
institution . . . .” 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(c)(2) (2012). The modifying language to indicate derivative
effects, that is, the phrase “directly, or indirectly” is missing from the text. For an example of a U.S.
Code provision that contemplates derivate effects using the “directly or indirectly” language, see
47 U.S.C. § 314 (2006) (prohibiting certain individuals from “directly, or indirectly” controlling,
purchasing, or otherwise acquiring certain technology affecting interstate commerce).
200. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 190 at 140 (2012) (“[T]he rules of grammar govern
unless they contradict legislative intent or purpose.”). The natural reading of the statutory provision
requires that the enumerated crime caused the effects to the federally insured financial institution.
Id. The subject, the enumerated crimes, must affect the object, the federally insured financial
institutions. See 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(c)(2). As a transitive verb, “affect” must link the subject and
the object. See id. Therefore, the enumerated crime itself, not the action taken by the prosecutorial
authority, must cause the effects on the federally insured financial institution. See id.
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settlements and attorneys’ fees constitute effects, a natural reading of the statute
indicates that the enumerated crimes themselves must cause the effects.201
However, an important distinction the courts have failed to account for is the
modifying phrase “federally insured.”202 This modifying phrase is not found in
the comparable statutes.203 Under a surplusage argument, Congress must have
intended a specific application when it added this phrase to civil penalties
provision, in contrast to § 3293(2).204 The courts have failed to differentiate
between the language of § 3293 and the civil penalties provision.205 Under the
civil penalties provision, the fraud must affect a federally insured financial
institution, which limits the statute’s applicability to those institutions that have
federally insured deposits.206 The FDIC insurance is provided to protect the
deposits.207 Therefore, the fraud must affect the deposits or a depositor in some
way.208
B. The Provision’s Structure Shows an Intent to Protect Deposits and
Depositors
When the statute’s plain language is not dispositive, one looks to the structure
of the provision to give context.209 The structure of the civil penalties provision,
in relation to the rest of FIRREA, and in comparison to § 3293(2), supports
Congress’ intent to protect depositors through § 1833a.210 Because the structure

201. Contra United States v. Ghavami, No. 10 Cr. 1217(KMW), 2012 WL 2878126, at *6
(S.D.N.Y July 13, 2012); United States v. Ohle, 687 F. Supp. 2d 215, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). The
natural reading of the statute would not support these cases’ holdings that the effects on the
federally insured financial institution from the initiation of a lawsuit would be the kind of effects
contemplated by the drafters of the civil penalties provision. See 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(c)(2). Instead,
the commission of the enumerated crimes, such as mail and wire fraud, must cause the effects on
the federally insured financial institution. See supra note 200.
202. See 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(c)(2) (2012).
203. See supra Part II.C.
204. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 190, at 174 (explaining that no word in a statute should
be overlooked or ignored when interpreting the statute). Therefore, the inclusion of the “federally
insured” modifier is of consequence and must be considered in the analysis of the statute’s
application. See id.
205. See supra Part III.A.
206. See supra note 34.
207. See supra note 34.
208. See supra note 34; see also supra notes 199–204 and accompanying text.
209. See United States v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d 438, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(noting the defendant’s argument that, if the court finds the statute’s text unclear, the court should
construe the “victimization” limitation by examining 12 U.S.C. § 1833a’s structure); see generally
R. Randall Kelso, Statutory Interpretation Doctrine on the Modern Supreme Court and Four
Doctrinal Approaches to Judicial Decision–Making, 25 PEPP. L. REV. 37, 37–41 (1997) (examining
the various approaches to statutory interpretation applied by the members of the Supreme Court).
210. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT,
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 263 (2000) (describing the “whole act rule” for
statutory interpretation and stating that “[a] provision that may seem ambiguous in insolation is

784

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 63:759

and terms used in § 3293(2) are similar to § 1833a, it is logical to conclude that
the “affects” analysis under the § 3293(2) cases is applicable to cases under §
1833a.211 As the court held in Bank of N.Y. Mellon, the term “affecting” might
have a closer meaning to the word “involving” because the subtitle of the
provision in FIRREA was entitled “Civil Penalties for Violations Involving
Financial Institutions.”212 Therefore, the court concluded that because the text
of the act referred to violations involving financial institutions, the civil penalties
provision should have a similar reading.213 Such a reading supports the courts’
holdings and the textual argument that the effects can be broad, and also limited
by reasonable foreseeability and attenuated circumstances.
However, the phrase “federally insured” is unique to § 1833a.214 Because this
phrase is absent from § 3293(2), it must mean that the civil penalties provision
requires something more than an effect on a financial institution.215 Therefore,
in order to be liable, the defendant must have committed an enumerated crime
that affected federally insured deposits.216 The “federally insured” requirement
clearly focuses on the effects on deposits and depositors and the health and
strength of the depository institution.217 While some may argue that the modifier
is intended to identify a subset of financial institutions to which this civil
penalties provision will apply; 218 such an argument relies on the specific
characteristic of these types of financial institutions, i.e., these institutions hold
federally insured deposits. In addition, the statute is located within Chapter 16
of Title 12 of the United States Code, which is titled “Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation.” 219 The location of the statute further supports the structural
argument that the provision is focused on the effects on deposits. 220
often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme”) (quoting United Savings Ass’n of Texas
v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
211. United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 12 Civ. 7527(JMF), 2013 WL 5312564, at
*28 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2013) (citing Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101 (2003)). The
court used Supreme Court precedent to “explain[] that where the same term is used in two different
provisions of the same statute, it is ‘logical to assume that the [same] term . . . would carry the same
meaning with respect to both provisions.’” Id. (quoting Costa, 539 U.S. at 101). See also
ESKRIDGE, supra note 210, at 283.
212. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 454 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
ESKRIDGE, supra note 210, at 272.
213. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 454.
214. 12 U.S.C. § 1833a (2012). This phrase is absent from the comparative statutes, such as
18 U.S.C. § 3293(2). 18 U.S.C. § 3293(2) (2012). See also supra Part II.C.
215. See supra note 204.
216. See supra Part IV.A.
217. See supra notes 34 and 45.
218. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
219. See 12 U.S.C. § 1833a. Title 12 of the U.S. Code is “Banks and Banking” and Chapter
16, which includes the civil penalties provision, covers the FDIC. See 12 U.S.C. (2012).
220. FDIC Mission, Vision, and Values, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.
gov/about/mission/ (last updated May 4, 2009) (noting that the FDIC is primarily concerned with
protecting the deposits at insured financial institutions).
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Additionally, because “financial institution,” as defined in 12 U.S.C. § 1813, is
modified by “federally insured,” only certain statutory definitions will apply,
that is, the statute applies only to institutions whose deposits are insured. 221
These definitions focus on the deposits and depository status of the institution.222
Therefore, while the structure of the civil penalties provision supports a broad
reading of the “affects” element, the statute’s structure shows that the provision
requires that the fraud affect the federally insured deposits.223
C. Congress Intended to Protect Depositors and Their Deposits
The legislative intent bolsters the reading of the statute to focus on
depositors. 224 Like the text and structure of FIRREA, the legislative intent
focuses on protecting deposits and depositors, not the financial institution
itself.225 FIRREA sets forth the following general purposes of the statute:
(3) To curtail investments and other activities of savings associations
that pose unacceptable risks to the Federal deposit insurance funds. . .
. (5) To put the Federal deposit insurance funds on a sound financial
footing. . . . (8) To provide funds from public and private sources to
deal expeditiously with failed depository institutions. . . . (9) To
strengthen the enforcement powers of Federal regulators of depository
institutions. . . . (10) To strengthen the civil sanctions and criminal
penalties for defrauding or otherwise damaging depository institutions
and their depositors.226
The statute’s stated purpose and legislative concerns shows that Congress
aimed to protect the federal deposits from fraudulent conduct by imposing civil
penalties under § 1833a.227 The provision would protect depositors and federal
taxpayers from future risks of crises resulting from fraudulent behavior. 228
Therefore, a reading of the civil penalties provision requiring that the
enumerated fraud affect federal deposits is consistent with legislative intent.229

221. See 12 U.S.C. § 1813(c)(1)–(4), (h) (2012) (providing definitions of depository
institutions and related terms).
222. Id.
223. See supra notes 209–23.
224. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 210, at 213–14, 295 (defining legislative history as the “record
of deliberations surrounding, and generally prior to, the law’s enforcement”).
225. See infra notes 244–47.
226. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101
-73, § 101(3),(5),(8)–(10), 103 Stat. 183, 187.
227. See supra Part II.A–B.
228. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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V. A LIMITED READING OF THE FIRREA CIVIL PENALTIES PROVISION
Based on the plain text of the statute, its structure, and the legislative intent,
the civil penalties provision must be read broadly. 230 However, courts must
determine whether the enumerated crimes actually affected federally insured
deposits. These effects must be sufficiently direct,231 reasonably foreseeable,232
and not too attenuated.233 Therefore, in the application to RMBS fraud and other
alleged fraud associated with the financial crisis, the scope of the civil penalties
provision must be read with these limitations in mind. Courts should determine
if the alleged fraudulent conduct affected a federally insured financial institution
in such a way that threatened the security of deposits or the viability of the
federal depository institution itself. However, courts need to be mindful of
attenuation concerns. 234 For instance, including such broad effects like
subjection to litigation and attorneys’ costs would not be sufficient to constitute
an effect on the federally insured deposits.235 However, because the deposits are
federally insured, fraudulent behavior may result in potential effects on the
Deposit Insurance Fund, which could be sufficient to find a violation.236
The pre-crisis financial industry was heavily interdependent because of the
structure of the RMBSs.237 When considering the effect of allegedly fraudulent
conduct in mortgage lending, securitization, or sales of RMBSs, courts must
determine whether it was reasonably foreseeable that any fraudulent behavior
could or would have an effect on deposits.238 The regulatory environment and
lack of government oversight created a moral hazard problem in which the risky
lending and securitization practices were encouraged and overlooked.239 The
structure created an interdependent network based on the mortgage loans, and
the risks were shared at each level. 240 The structure of the large holding
companies, like Bank of America, N.A., with mortgage and securities
230. See supra Part IV.
231. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
232. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
234. See United States v. Agne, 214 F.3d 47, 53 (1st Cir. 2000) (stating that increased risk
alone could be sufficient to “affect” a federally insured financial institution, but the risk cannot be
too attenuated from the fraudulent conduct); United States v. Ubakanma, 215 F.3d 421, 426 (4th
Cir. 2000) (holding that a financial institution is not affected by wire fraud if the institution is not
a victim of fraud).
235. Contra United States v. Ohle, 678 F. Supp. 2d 215, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding that a
financial institution was affected when it was required to pay attorneys’ fees and a settlement). If
the provision is read as requiring an effect on the federally insured deposits, then attorneys fees’
and settlement costs would not affect the federally insured deposits. See supra notes 200–01 and
accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 45–48 and accompanying text.
237. See supra Part I.A.
238. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
239. See supra Part I.A.1.
240. See supra notes 34–45 and accompanying text.
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subsidiaries, plays an important role in the analysis of whether the fraudulent
conduct affected the deposits held by other subsidiaries or the parent
company.241 In essence, the government, defense lawyers, and courts will need
to examine the structure of the financial institution, the shared risk of the various
components of the company, and the effects on the deposits or the federally
insured depository institutions. Merely alleging highly attenuated, indirect
effects on the institution caused by alleged fraud, such as harm to reputation,
high settlement costs, or the payment of attorneys’ fees, is inconsistent with the
text, structure, and legislative intent of the civil penalties provision.242
VI. CONCLUSION
The DOJ’s use of FIRREA’s civil penalties provision in situations of alleged
RMBS fraud is likely to prove effective in combating the fraud that permeated
our financial system and led to the world-wide recession. However, courts have
recognized there are certain limitations to FIRREA’s applicability. Considering
FIRREA’s purpose and language, the application of the civil penalties provision
must be limited to situations where the fraud affected federally insured deposits
or depositors. This is an important legal issue because the government will need
to assess the implications of the potential limitations on the provision’s
applicability when considering using the civil penalty provision as part of the
government’s fraud enforcement scheme. In addition, the banking industry is
sure to face future claims and will need to know how to properly shape or defend
its conduct. Therefore, a more careful reading of the statuatory language of
FIRREA, along with a closer inspection of the statute’s legislative intent, both
by the government and the banking industry, will guide both towards a more
appropriate application of FIRREA’s civil penalties provision.

241. See Complaint, supra note 7, at *18–26 (explaining the structure of Bank of America,
N.A., the parent company, and its subsidiary companies).
242. See supra text accompanying notes 230–35.
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